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hoice in education is an
issue that ranks high on
the political agendas of
governments around the
world and is increasingly
being pushed hard in the UK. While many
regard choice as a value per se, most
proponents emphasise the improvement
in educational standards that could result
from it.
There are two main economic
arguments for moving from a
neighbourhood-based system – in which
pupils attend their local school – to a
system based on parental choice. The first
is about allocation: more choice allows
better matching of pupils with schools
according to personal tastes and
pedagogical needs. If every parent can find
a school that educates their child at least
as effectively as under a neighbourhood-
based system, then average achievement
must improve.
The second argument is about
teaching technology: if families are free to
choose, then the mechanisms of market
discipline will ensure that schools offer
high standards. For this to work, school
finances (and headteachers’ incentives)
must be linked to school popularity via
pupil numbers: unpopular schools must
lose pupils and money while popular
schools gain pupils and additional funding.
So schools must innovate and adapt to
meet parental demand for ‘quality’ or
shrink and ultimately close.
There are counter-arguments in
defence of a neighbourhood-based school
admission system. For example, it is
claimed that teaching proceeds better in a
stable environment, where teachers are not
under competitive pressures. Classes in a
choice-based system may suffer higher
pupil turnover, which can further disrupt
teaching. And the distances that pupils
have to travel will be greater under a
choice-based system, and this may have a
detrimental effect on achievement because
of lateness or stress.
But the biggest concern about wider
parental choice seems to be that even if it
has the potential to boost pupil
achievements, this may come at the cost of
increased inequality across schools. The
fear is that if the most disadvantaged
families are least able to exercise choice,
then less socially disadvantaged, higher
ability pupils will end up concentrated in
schools with the best resources and
teaching, so that the gains from
competition are unevenly distributed. 
But there are also reasons to think that
breaking the link between where pupils
live and where they attend school will
reduce inequalities between schools. This
might happen if, for example, pupils in
social housing can more easily access
schools in better neighbourhoods.
Since the theoretical advantages of
competition and choice seem so uncertain,
is the current policy focus on expansion of
parental choice and school competition
founded on a strong evidence base?
Unfortunately not: extensive US
research using various methods and data
A central focus of current education policy is to
expand parents’ choice over where their
children go to school and to promote
competition between schools. A long-running
CEP research programme by Stephen Gibbons,
Stephen Machin and Olmo Silva has been
assessing the effects on both educational
outcomes and inequalities between schools.




sources is very mixed in its findings about
the performance effects of this type of
policy. The scant UK-based research has
been similarly inconclusive. Moreover, none
of the evidence so far reveals whether any
improvements in educational standards are
caused by pupils finding more suitable
schools or by efficiency gains induced by
market discipline. 
More has been written about the
effects of choice and competition on
segregation in the UK context, but again
there is no consensus. Much of this work
is based on observations of what has
happened in schools since the reforms
started in the late 1980s: while some
researchers claim that these reforms led to
a decrease in social stratification, others
find evidence for the opposite.
So, on the basis of the available
international evidence, the conclusion that
the gains from competition and choice
more than compensate for any losses
resulting from greater inequality – what
US education economist Caroline Hoxby




Our research has mainly focused on the
effects of parental choice and school
competition on pupil progress during
primary education. As a measure of choice
we use detailed information on where
pupils live and where they go to school in
order to work out which alternative
schools they had available. Knowing this,
we can deduce which schools are
‘competitive’ – in the sense that their
pupils had many choices available – and
which are not. 
Our study focuses on an area around
and including London, which encompasses
200,000 pupils in 2,400 primary schools.
The area is urban and suburban in
character, but there is great variation in
the number of schools that are accessible
from a particular home.
How do we work out which schools a
pupil can reach from their home? We do
this by studying how far other children
travel to local schools. So, for example, if
pupils at Springfield Primary travel, on
average, 1km to school and Lisa lives
within 1km of Springfield Primary, then we
would treat Springfield Primary as a
possible choice for Lisa – even if she
actually attends a different school.
Once we know how many choices
pupils have, it is easy to work out which
schools are more competitive: simply
calculate the average number of choices
that pupils have in each school. If all the
pupils in a school have that school as their
only option, then the school is
‘monopolistic’, rather than competitive.
But if, on average, pupils in a school have
lots of alternatives, then the school has to
compete with those other schools to
attract its pupils.
Ideally, we need to look at differences
in choice and competition that vary
according to where a family lives and
where schools are located; but we do not
want to consider differences that are the
result of the choices parents make about
which school to attend or which school to
live close to.
We isolate this by looking closely at
local education authority (LEA) boundaries.
This is because, for the years in our data,
LEA boundaries imposed important
institutional restrictions on parental choice:
families were allowed to apply to schools
in LEAs other than their LEA of residence,
but in practice primary school pupils rarely
crossed LEA boundaries to go to school.
This is probably because parents felt that
banking on admission outside their own
LEA was a high-risk strategy: they had to
make separate applications to each LEA
and may have doubted that they would be
given the same priority as pupils who lived
in the same LEA as the school.
Indeed, it turns out that, in our study
area, only 4.7% of community school
pupils attend schools outside their home
LEA. The highest rate of LEA crossing is for
pupils in ‘voluntary aided’ schools
(predominantly faith schools), but this is
still only about 10%.
Because families living near LEA
boundaries generally do not cross to
neighbouring LEAs, they face longer
journeys than families in the interior of an
LEA to reach the same number of schools.
And since travel is costly, they face a more
restricted set of choices and are more
likely to send their children to nearby
schools inside their own LEA. In turn,
schools near to LEA boundaries face less
competition because they do not have to
compete with so many other schools for
this pool of pupils.
In short, the nearer a pupil lives to the
LEA boundary, the less choice they will
have, and the nearer a school is to the LEA
boundary, the less competition it will face.
If more competition and choice improve
the rate at which a pupil progresses at
school, then we would expect to see lower
attainment among pupils living and
attending school near LEA boundaries than
among pupils living centrally. We can use
this relationship to determine whether





Is there really any difference in the number
of choices that pupils have (according to
our definition) and do schools in different
locations really face varying degrees of
competition? The number of school
choices available to families certainly
differs from place to place. On average,
apart from their own school, every child
has one to two schools they could have
gone to instead. Very few children have
more than three local alternatives. But one
in four pupils have no other schools within
a reasonable travel distance.
These differences show up as variation
in the level of competition faced by
different schools. This can be seen in
Figure 1, which maps our competition
index over the London area.
Some schools (those located in the
darkest shaded areas) have as many as
seven competitor schools. But many others
(those located in the unshaded areas)
appear to be completely monopolistic in
the sense that there are no local
alternatives for their pupils: our detailed
analysis shows that this is the case for one
in every ten schools.
The map shows that this variation is
only partly related to urban centrality and
density. Some of the highest values of our
competition index occur in suburban
districts such as Barnet and Brent, while
schools in some inner city areas like south
Hackney or Southwark face little
competition from each other.
Our first question is whether this
variation in any way affects a child’s











of academic progress, we use the standard
‘value-added’ scores collected by the
Department for Education and Skills to
track pupil and school performance in the
primary years.
It turns out that there is indeed a
positive correlation between the
competition that a school faces from other
schools, and the rate at which pupils at
that school progress. In contrast, the
number of choices that parents have at
their home address is unrelated to their
children’s rate of progress.
Taken at face value, this indicates
small but significant gains for pupils in
schools facing more competition, but no
individual gains from being offered more
school choices. But when we look instead
at differences between pupils living close
to and far away from LEA boundaries, the
picture is quite different. Schools close to
LEA boundaries where the market is less
competitive actually perform slightly better
than schools further away from the
boundary – the implication being that
greater competition tends to reduce
school performance (see Table 1).
Using this approach, we find that an
increase of one additional competitor
school reduces average pupil progress by
about half a term (5-6 weeks) between
the ages of 7 and 11. But we do not have
very precise estimates and cannot rule out
the possibility that there is simply no
relationship at all between competition
and performance. If we look at the
number of school choices available to
parents using this method, we again find
no measurable impact on their children’s
personal attainment at school.
Autonomy, urban density and
school performance
Perhaps the reason we find little real
positive benefit from competition is
because the mechanisms to make it work
are just not in place: schools must have the
right incentives to respond if competition is
to be effective in raising standards.
While all state schools in England are
funded according to the number of pupils
on the roll, and headteachers’ pay is
linked to performance (both going some
way towards providing the right
incentives), admissions policy and
autonomy from LEA control also play a
role. What usually happens is that a
central LEA admissions team simply
reallocates pupils from popular,
oversubscribed schools to unpopular
schools, preventing competitive incentives
from operating.
Some schools are, however, quite
independent of LEA influence and control
their admissions – especially faith schools
and others classed as voluntary aided. In
these schools, the religious or charitable
institution that owns the school premises
has a majority representation on the
governing body and a strong influence over
its running; the governing body is also the
admissions authority. In community schools,
governance is shared more equally among
LEA representatives, teaching staff and
parents, and admissions are controlled by
the LEA. Perhaps the place to look for
competition effects is among schools in the
voluntary aided sector.
In this sector, we do find some
evidence that competition is positively
related to performance. For voluntary aided
schools, one additional competitor is linked
to a 1.6 point increase in the average pupil
value-added at a school, or 16-19 weeks
of progress in one of the core subjects,
between the ages of 7 and 11. Then
again, this estimate is quite imprecise and
Table 1:
Summarising the effects of parental choice and school






































Primary school competition in the Greater London area
Note: This figure maps the local average of the school-level competition index described in the
text. A school in the unshaded areas has none or just one competitor school. A school in the
darkest shaded areas has six or seven competitor schools. Each level of shading represents a
one-school interval in the competition index between these two limits.
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does not suggest a particularly strong link
between competition and performance.
We have also used an alternative
strategy to uncover the possible effects
from competition on secondary school
attainments. In this work, we look more
generally at how urban density affects
pupil test results.
The impression that most people have is
that schools in densely populated inner-urban
areas offer a poor education. In fact, by
looking at the changes in academic
achievement that take place after pupils
move from primary school to secondary
school, we show that density is a good thing.
Pupils perform slightly better when they are
at school in places that are highly urbanised
and – particularly importantly – where there
are many other neighbouring schools.
There are many possible explanations for
the stronger performance of pupils in dense
school markets, but a strong candidate is
greater inter-school competition among
secondary schools located close together in




So greater competition arising from more
parental choice does not seem to boost
performance among primary schools
generally. But it may be effective among
some autonomous primary schools and
among secondary schools.
Critics of choice-based reforms point
to their potential costs in terms of
increased inequality between schools. They
argue that better-off parents are more
able to make good decisions about school
quality and to get what they want from
the admissions authorities, as well as
being less constrained by transport costs.
The main concern here is not just that
schools become segregated in terms of
pupils’ ethnicity or income, but also that
academically able and less able children
become segregated into different schools.
This means that some schools and pupils
could lose out because of the additional
difficulties and resource costs involved in
teaching lower ability groups.
One key question is whether the
potential gains in performance we find in
a minority of schools are accompanied by
wider inequalities. We can answer this
question within the same framework we
used when looking at pupil attainment in
primary schools, but now asking whether
schools facing high levels of competition
draw in pupils with a narrower range of
abilities than more monopolistic schools.
To measure the diversity of abilities
within a school, we use one of many
standard indices of inequality between
individuals. The index we choose in our
work on segregation is the Gini index,
calculated on pupil test results at the ages
of 7 and 11. The test results at the earlier
age mainly capture intake differences,
whereas results at the age of 11 also
reflect influences during the primary
school years.
The key point is that if competitive
schools are more educationally segregated,
they will have lower pupil Gini indices than
non-competitive schools. This is exactly
what we find, although our estimates are
not so precise that we can be completely
confident of our conclusions: schools
located near LEA boundaries where there is
less choice and which therefore face less
competition tend to have pupils with a
wider range of abilities; this is true at the
ages of both 7 and 11.
Although not precisely estimated, the
possible effects of competition on ability
segregation are very large. The average
school that enrols pupils who have no
other feasible alternatives has a diversity
index of around 0.41. By contrast, a highly
competitive school enrolling pupils with as
many as eight alternative choices would
have a diversity index of just 0.25. 
The effects of expanding
choice
Choice and competition have been at the
centre of recent policy debates on how to
improve educational standards. But as it
stands, according to our research, pupils
with many primary schools close to home
do no better than pupils who have few
local schools. So either families are not
exercising the choice that they have or
they are making choices that do not offer
any academic benefits.
On the other hand, our research
provides some support for the view that
policy intervention to introduce market
mechanisms as a means of stimulating
inter-school competition and innovation
may work to boost pupil achievements.
Although there seem to be no general
benefits from competition at the primary
level – it seems weakly linked to worse
performance – we do find some evidence
that schools running their own admission
systems and characterised by more
autonomous governance structures 
have higher educational standards in 
more competitive markets. And pupils do
seem to do better if their secondary school
is in an urban environment and not
geographically isolated from other schools.
On the downside, we have also
uncovered evidence that school
competition increases inequality, with high-
and low-ability pupils more segregated in
schools that face more competition. This
suggests that whatever performance
advantages it offers, further expansion of
market mechanisms in education may come
at the cost of increased social polarisation.
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